Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of  Plain-Language  Jury Instructions by Gordon, Sara
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the 
Application of "Plain-Language" Jury Instructions 
Sara Gordon 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Other Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gordon, Sara, "Through the Eyes of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of "Plain-Language" 
Jury Instructions" (2013). Scholarly Works. 779. 
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/779 
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by 
the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact 
david.mcclure@unlv.edu. 
 [643] 
Through the Eyes of Jurors:  
The Use of Schemas in the Application of  
“Plain-Language” Jury Instructions 
Sara Gordon* 
“Through the Eyes of Jurors” is the first law journal article to consider all of the major 
cognitive psychology studies that examine how “schemas,” or the preexisting notions 
jurors have about the law, shape jurors’ use of jury instructions, even when those jurors 
are given “plain-language” instructions. This Article examines the social science research 
on schema theory in order to advance our understanding of how schemas continue to 
influence jurors’ use of jury instructions, even when those jurors are given “plain 
language” instructions. 
 
A significant body of legal literature has examined jurors’ use and understanding of jury 
instructions, and many scholars have recommended methods to improve juror 
comprehension of instructions. This Article takes that analysis a step further, and argues 
that even when given “plain-language” jury instructions, jurors will still be influenced by 
their preconceived ideas of what the “law” is—in other words, by the preexisting schemas 
they have for legal concepts. Furthermore, these schemas are often legally incorrect, and 
findings from the social sciences suggest that—even when given plain-language jury 
instructions with the correct legal standard—jurors may still apply these legally 
inappropriate schemas. This Article synthesizes the results and underlying theories 
derived from those findings in order to examine the impact these schemas have on jury 
decisionmaking, and on jurors’ use of jury instructions, and to identify ways lawyers and 
judges can counteract inappropriate existing schemas and activate legally appropriate 
schemas before jurors are introduced to the facts they are expected to interpret. 
Specifically, courts should use principles of cognitive and educational psychology to 
develop jurors’ schemas for the applicable legal concepts to make their schemas better 
organized and therefore more accessible. Such schemas would allow for more thoughtful 
judgment and better, more accurate decisionmaking. 
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Pollman, Terry Pollman, Kathy Stanchi, Jean Sternlight, and the participants of the ALWD Scholars’ 
Forum for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Chad Schatzle and Ashley Nikkel 
for their excellent research assistance. 
644 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:643 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 644 
I. Jury Instructions and Schemas ........................................................ 647 
A.  Different Types of Schemas: Self, Person, Role, and 
Event .......................................................................................... 651 
B.  Schema Activation: Priming and Framing ........................... 653 
C.  The Perseverance Effect, Confirmation Bias, and 
Biased Assimilation ................................................................ 656 
D.  Expert v. Novice Schemas ....................................................... 660 
II. Why We Need to Go Beyond “Plain-Language” Instructions .. 662 
III. The Importance of the Representative Jury and Special 
Juries as Models for Improvement ................................................... 665 
IV. Recommendations: How to Correct Old Schemas and  
Create New Ones ................................................................................. 668 
A.  Developing Jurors’ Schemas to Make Them Legally 
Accurate ................................................................................... 670 
B.  Helping Jurors Reduce Schema Perseverance .................. 675 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 676 
 
Introduction 
Assume that you serving on a jury deciding a capital case. The 
defendant, John Smith, is on trial for murder. You are satisfied that the 
evidence has established guilt, but you must also recommend a sentence. 
You have two options: the death penalty and life without parole. You 
know what “death penalty” means, but what about “life without parole”? 
Does it mean exactly what it says—that under no circumstances will 
Smith ever be released? Or might he be released anyway, perhaps for 
demonstrating good behavior in prison or if the prison becomes 
overcrowded? The jury instruction does not answer the question, so you 
are left to your own preexisting understanding. Your answer may be a 
matter of life or death for Smith because you may think that the only way 
to protect the public from future danger is to impose the death penalty. 
In fact, even if a jury instruction assures you that a sentence of life 
without parole means that Smith will never be freed, cognitive research 
indicates that you may still choose death in order to prevent future danger. 
In other words, you may continue to adhere to your preexisting idea even 
if a jury instruction clearly and directly sets out a different answer. Thus, 
there is a lot at stake when we study the effectiveness of jury instructions. 
In the past several decades, much of the social science research on 
juries has focused on jurors’ ability to remember, understand, and apply 
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the judge’s instructions correctly, and studies have almost universally 
returned results finding that, by and large, jurors are confused by jury 
instructions and often disregard them.1 In one empirical study of juror 
confusion, researchers tested the extent to which jurors understood 
pattern jury instructions commonly used in civil and criminal cases and 
found that the jurors understood less than half the content of the tested 
instructions.2 Because of this lack of jury understanding, much of the 
literature about jury instructions has focused on ways to improve juror 
comprehension. Among other suggested reforms, scholars have 
encouraged the use of psycholinguistic principles to rewrite instructions 
to improve vocabulary, syntax, and organization to make the instructions 
simpler and more comprehensible to jurors.3 
 
 1. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: 
Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 788 (2000); Amiram Elwork 
et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 Law & Hum. Behav. 163 (1977); 
David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478 
(1976). 
 2. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to 
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 77, 78 (1988). For an extensive collection of cases documenting juror 
misunderstanding, see id. at 79–83. In a study designed to learn the extent to which jurors referred to 
the instructions during deliberations, the authors discovered that most jurors try to use the instructions 
but are often confused by their meaning. Id. at 78. In that study, people called for jury service watched 
a videotaped reenactment of a murder trial; 25% of the jurors’ deliberations cited material from the 
instructions, and jurors made seven incorrect statements about the meaning of the judge’s instructions, 
only one of which was corrected by other jurors. Id. at 84 (citing Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury 
(1983)). In another study by Strawn and Buchanan, 116 people summoned for jury service but not 
chosen for a jury were divided into two groups. Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 480. One group 
heard a twenty-five minute videotape of instructions in a burglary case. Id. Even after hearing the 
instructions, however, many of these jurors either misunderstood or did not accept certain instructions. 
Id. Despite instructions to the contrary, 43% believed that circumstantial evidence was of no value, 
and 23% believed that when faced with equal evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the 
defendant should be convicted. Id. at 481. Jurors also misunderstood words in the instructions; only 
51% understood the word “demeanor.” Id. at 481–82. 
 3. Psycholinguistics applies the theories of experimental psychology to the problems of language 
processing and comprehension. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language 
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1306, 1308 (1979); 
see Elwork et al., supra note 1, at 165–69; Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science 
Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 589, 623–27 (1997). Other 
commonly proposed reforms have focused on encouraging active participation by jurors by allowing 
jurors to take notes and ask questions of the courts and witnesses. See, e.g., Council for Court 
Excellence District of Columbia Jury Project, Juries for the Year 2000 and Beyond: Proposals 
to Improve the Jury Systems in Washington, D.C. (1998); The Honorable B. Michael Dann, 
“Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 Ind. L.J. 
1229, 1251–56 (1993). Several studies have examined the impact of allowing jurors to take notes and to 
ask questions. Jurors will generally take notes when given the opportunity, and one study found that 
jurors who took notes felt they participated more during deliberation. Victor E. Flango, Would Jurors 
Do a Better Job if They Could Take Notes?, 63 Judicature 436, 442 (1980); Larry Heuer & Steven 
Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 
79 Judicature 256, 258 (1996). Jurors who were allowed to ask questions generally asked three or 
fewer questions and focused on the definition of key legal terms. Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth 
F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 
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Less attention has been paid, however, to why jurors are not always 
guided by even the clearest jury instructions.4 A large part of the answer 
may be the power of a juror’s own “preconstructions, preferred meanings, 
rhetorical and ideological dimensions.”5 The purpose of this Article is to 
examine the impact these preconstructions, or “schemas,” have on jury 
decisionmaking and on jurors’ use of jury instructions, and to identify 
ways lawyers and judges can both counteract inappropriate existing 
schemas and activate legally appropriate schemas before jurors are 
introduced to the facts they are expected to interpret. 
Specifically, I recommend that courts use principles of cognitive and 
educational psychology to develop jurors’ schemas for the relevant legal 
concepts to make those schemas more flexible and better organized, and 
therefore allow for more accurate and more efficient decisionmaking. 
This prescription balances the competing goals of maintaining juries that 
represent a reasonable cross section of their communities (a jury of 
peers), and of ensuring that those jurors are prepared and competent to 
analyze the law and facts that they will encounter in a trial. Because 
jurors are legal novices, they view and interpret both the law and the 
facts differently than lawyers and judges,6 and most jury instructions do 
not do enough to help jurors compensate for this lack of expertise or 
develop appropriate schemas for legal concepts—especially given the 
time constraints imposed by a typical trial. Moreover, because they are 
typically drafted by lawyers (or committees of lawyers)7 who are already 
legal experts, the instructions are often not drafted with novices in mind 
or using principles that will best ensure novices fully comprehend the 
law. 
I propose that the goal of jury instructions should be two-fold: first, to 
give jurors the applicable law, and second, to help jurors correct existing 
schemas and develop new and legally correct schemas before they are 
exposed to the evidence in a trial. Although it would be impossible—and 
contrary to the idea of a representative jury—to bring jurors’ legal 
knowledge to the level of lawyers and judges in such a short period of 
time, the instructions can incorporate principles of educational psychology 
to help jurors develop new schemas efficiently and therefore maximize 
learning. Moreover, these reworked instructions should be given to jurors 
 
17 Law & Soc’y Rev. 153, 170–71 (1982). It is less clear whether note taking and asking questions 
influence juror comprehension of the instructions. 
 4. See discussion infra Part II. 
 5. Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 
204 (1987). 
 6. See Fleurie Nievelstein et al., Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological 
Knowledge in the Legal Domain, 20 Eur. J. Cognitive Psychol. 1043 (2008); see also discussion infra 
Part IV.A. 
 7. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the 
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1081, 1085 (2001). 
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before the introduction of evidence. This will assist jurors in developing 
appropriate schemas for the legal concepts at issue before they are asked 
to apply those concepts to the facts in the trial. 
Part I of this Article first discusses the use of jury instructions, as well 
as the role of schemas, in how people view, interpret, and remember 
information. Once established, schemas influence what information people 
notice and how they interpret that information. Jurors are therefore 
usually unable to separate existing schemas (which may or may not be 
legally correct) from their use and application of jury instructions.8 This 
Part also discusses the difference between expert schemas (those held by 
lawyers and judges) and novice schemas (those typically held by jurors). 
Part II reviews the social science literature on how schemas affect jurors’ 
use of both pattern jury instructions and instructions rewritten according 
to psycholinguistic principles. Part III then discusses the importance of the 
representative jury (a jury of peers) in the American legal system. This 
Article does not suggest that we should abandon that system in favor of 
the use of “special juries” of experts, but instead recommends that courts 
help lay juries develop expertise in the applicable law in order to create 
legally appropriate schemas. Finally, Part IV recommends methods to 
correct jurors’ existing schemas and develop new schemas that are better 
organized and more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment and 
better, more uniform decisionmaking. Educational psychology principles 
inform this discussion and help illuminate how to more efficiently teach 
jurors to use relevant legal concepts and overcome schema perseverance. 
I.  Jury Instructions and Schemas 
Jury instructions play an important role in all stages of the trial 
process. These instructions are generally culled from the applicable 
statutes and case law and drafted by attorneys or advisory committees.9 
Instructions tell jurors about the applicable law and give them a 
mechanism with which to interpret the facts they have seen in a trial: 
Instructions are meant to ensure uniformity in verdicts and are typically 
given at the beginning of a trial, as needed throughout the trial, and at the 
end of closing arguments.10 Jurors are generally given the most extensive 
instructions at the end of a trial—including a recitation of the applicable 
law and how that law should apply to the facts.11 Instructions, therefore, 
 
 8. See generally Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 180–81 (1984). 
 9. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Tiersma, supra note 7, at 1084. 
 10. Different types of instructions address the different things the jury is asked to consider. Some 
instructions tell jurors how to evaluate evidence and weigh the credibility of witnesses, some explain 
the burden of proof, and others provide definitions and elements of crimes or claims. Neil Vidmar & 
Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 161 (2007). 
 11. Although there are few laws regulating the use and timing of instructions, the judge’s 
authority to manage a trial effectively allows for instructions at any point. Neil P. Cohen, The Timing 
of Jury Instructions, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 681, 684 (2000). As Cohen notes, Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of 
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are the crucial link between how a juror perceives and understands the 
facts they are told and how they use those facts to reach a verdict, but 
jurors do not typically receive these guiding principles until after they 
have seen the evidence.12 When jurors do finally receive instructions, they 
are often full of language taken from statutes and cases that may have 
different meanings to the lawyers who wrote the instructions than they 
do to the jurors who are being asked to use them. While they may be 
written plainly, they do not generally offer much guidance to jurors 
about how to apply them to the facts they have just heard in order to 
reach a decision. 
Several models attempt to explain how jurors use the facts and law to 
come to a decision, and most recognize that jurors rely to some extent on 
their understanding of how the world works in reaching a decision about 
the facts. The most prominent of these is the story model of juror 
decisionmaking that suggests that in order to make sense of all of the 
evidence they are asked to evaluate, jurors construct a story of what they 
think happened.13 In this model, jurors use instructions to derive lists of 
the features of individual crimes or claims. If the story they have 
constructed shares enough features with the instructions, they will find 
the defendant guilty, and if it is missing too many requirements, they will 
find the defendant innocent.14 
Even with this model as a guide, however, it can still be difficult to 
determine precisely how jurors are using jury instructions to interpret the 
facts because the rules of evidence generally limit inquiry into the validity 
of jurors’ decisionmaking processes.15 As noted above, several studies 
have shown improved comprehension of plain-language jury instructions, 
 
Criminal Procedure gives the judge discretion to “instruct the jury before or after argument, or both,” 
and Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the court to “instruct the jury before or 
after the arguments are completed or at both times.” Id. at 686. Some studies have examined the 
benefit of providing jurors with instructions at the beginning and the end of a trial—instead of only at 
the end—in order to provide jurors with a cognitive framework of the law and help them to better 
retain and understand the evidence. One study showed that the timing of the instruction produced 
modest improvement in juror comprehension but did not improve recall of evidence or affect the 
jury’s verdict. See Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with 
Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 409, 424–26 (1989). 
 12. Imagine you were asked to make chocolate chip cookies and given a list of ingredients to mix 
together and, only once you had done that, were you told the precise amount of each ingredient to use, 
as well as the order in which you should add them to the batter. This is how jurors, ignorant of the 
precise technicalities of the law and the elements of claims, may experience their role at a standard 
trial. They know generally what the claim or crime is that they are being asked to consider, but have 
not been taught its basic principles or given any guidance about how to consider the vast amounts of 
evidence they will hear at the trial. 
 13. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story 
Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 519–20 (1991). 
 14. Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of 
Jury Instructions, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 381, 382 (1997). 
 15. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 
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but this alone does not tell us the extent to which jurors rely on those 
new instructions, or the extent to which they use some combination of 
the instructions and other factors in reaching a decision about the facts. 
Studies suggest it is almost certainly the latter. In addition to the 
instructions they receive, some jurors might also rely on their opinions of 
the lawyers16 or be swayed by strong opinions voiced by fellow jurors.17 
Others might make a decision based on their “gut.” But what all of them 
are probably doing, whether they know it (and most probably do not), is 
using schemas to interpret and make sense of the information they have 
heard during the trial to help them come to a verdict. 
A “schema” is a cognitive framework or concept that helps 
individuals organize and interpret information.18 For example, a schema 
for a party would contain ideas that are true about parties in most cases: 
Parties are social events where people come together to have fun and 
often involve drinking, eating, talking, and dancing. If someone were to 
attend a party, this schema would be used as a general framework that 
would shape their expectations of the event and guide their behavior 
once they were there.19 Similarly, while all trees are different from each 
other and possess a variety of different characteristics (different colors, 
shapes, numbers of branches), we can easily recognize a type of tree we 
have never encountered before as a tree because we have a schema for 
trees. 
Schemas are a type of cognitive shortcut—we rely on them to 
organize information and our past experiences so we can better and more 
 
 16. Adam Trahan & Daniel M. Stewart, Examining Capital Jurors’ Impressions of Attorneys’ 
Personal Characteristics and Their Impact on Sentencing Outcomes, 7 Applied Psychol. Crim. Just. 93, 
99 (2011) (noting that jurors in capital trials form impressions of attorneys based on physical 
characteristics, such as attractiveness, hygiene, and dress, and that these impressions have some 
influence on sentencing decisions); see id. at 102 (“Jurors who formed negative impressions of the 
defense attorneys were more likely to sentence their clients to death than those who reacted favorably 
toward the defense counsel.”). 
 17. Mark Costanzo, Psychology Applied to Law 151 (2004) (noting potential jurors judged to 
be “strong” are more often well educated and articulate and have a higher occupational status than 
their fellow potential jurors); see Samuel H. Solomon, How Jurors Make Decisions, DOAR Litigation 
Consulting 5 (May 2012) (noting that jurors often look to other jurors with “perceived or real subject 
matter expertise,” and advising attorneys to explore the backgrounds of jurors who might have such 
expertise and to address them subtly during the trial). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
 19. Martha Augoustinos & Iain Walker, Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction 33 
(1995). Definitions for schemas are varied. Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor describe a schema as “a 
cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus,” 
Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 140, while Reid Hastie defines schemas broadly to include “almost 
any of the abstract hypotheses, expectations, organizing principles, frames, implicational molecules, 
scripts, plans, or prototypes that have been proposed as abstract mental organizing systems or memory 
structures.” Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in 1 Social Cognition: The 
Ontario Symposium 39, 39 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981). Moreover, some scholars also use the 
term “knowledge structures” to refer to schemas. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1046. 
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efficiently understand new experiences.20 Schemas can be quite useful 
because they allow us to quickly interpret vast amounts of information and 
help us deal with confusing, missing, or unknown information.21 However, 
these frameworks can also influence what information we notice (we tend 
to notice information that fits into existing schemas and ignore that which 
does not), as well as what information we remember (we similarly tend 
to remember information that is consistent with established schemas and 
have more difficulty recalling that which is not).22 Of course, schemas can 
also be rigid or based on incomplete information and, in these 
circumstances, might require reassessment.23 
The process of schema development begins in early childhood. As 
we encounter things for the first time, we integrate the new information, 
activity, or concept into our memory by incorporating it into our 
schemas.24 A schema, therefore, represents an individual’s accumulated 
knowledge, beliefs, and experiences. Once developed, schemas are 
available for application to new situations, and this application process is 
automatic.25 We do not see a furry object with four legs and a tail, we see 
a cat; the cat schema is automatically activated by incoming information. 
This process occurs unintentionally and unconsciously, and the process 
does not interfere with other mental activity.26 Schemas therefore allow us 
to process information efficiently: Because we know what to expect, we do 
not have to approach each person or situation we encounter as completely 
novel. As Fiske and Taylor note, the “most fundamental principle 
suggested by schema research is that people simplify reality; they do so in 
part by interpreting specific instances in light of the general case.”27 
Before one can understand the significant impact that schemas have 
on jurors’ use of instructions, it is important to briefly recap the different 
types of schemas, as well as how people use them to interpret 
information. People have schemas for everything, including themselves, 
other people, the roles people play in society, and different types of 
events or activities.28 Furthermore, both priming and framing influence 
which schemas will be activated and applied in any given situation.29 
 
 20. Dorothy G. Singer & Tracey A. Revenson, A Piaget Primer: How a Child Thinks 17 (1978). 
 21. Augoustinos & Walker, supra note 19, at 32–33. 
 22. See generally Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 180–81. 
 23. Augoustinos & Walker, supra note 19, at 33. A stereotype is a type of schema, in that it 
organizes information about a particular group. Id. at 208; see infra note 38 (on stereotypes). 
 24. Singer & Revenson, supra note 20, at 17. 
 25. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and 
Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policy Makers 18 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 18. 
 27. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 141. 
 28. Id. at 149. 
 29. Id. at 175. Priming is the idea that more recently and frequently activated ideas will come 
more easily to mind, while framing refers to the ways in which speakers shape messages for listeners. 
See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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Once established, schemas persevere, sometimes even in the face of 
conflicting or contradictory information.30 Finally, as legal novices, jurors 
often have undeveloped or incorrect schemas for the legal concepts they 
are asked to apply in a typical trial. 
A. Different Types of Schemas: Self, Person, Role, and Event 
Most social science research focuses on four main categories of 
schemas: self schemas (information about one’s own personality, 
appearance, and behavior), person schemas (information about the traits 
and goals of others), role schemas (information about the role someone 
plays in society, such as age, race, sex, or profession), and event schemas 
or scripts (information about what usually happens in a particular setting 
or event).31 All of these schemas influence and guide how we perceive, 
remember, and make inferences about new information.32 
How a person sees herself and what she feels her personality is 
depends on her self-schema—the beliefs and ideas she has about herself.33 
People are either schematic or aschematic on particular attributes or 
personality dimensions.34 If an attribute is important to someone, or she 
thinks of herself as embodying strong components of that trait (“I am very 
political” or “I am outgoing”), she is said to be schematic as to that 
attribute. Conversely, if the person does not have a strong view of herself 
with regard to a particular trait, or it is less important to her (“Being 
athletic is not important to me—I don’t think about it one way or 
another”), then she is aschematic as to a particular trait. Like other 
schemas, once formed, self schemas are resistant to change. 
Unlike self schemas, person schemas organize our knowledge about 
other people. Person schemas are generally broken down into personality 
traits and goals, both of which determine what information is relevant to a 
given person or type of person.35 For example, a schema for the trait 
“brave” might include what brave people do (charge into burning buildings) 
and examples of brave people (police officers, World War II resistance 
fighters). Goal schemas are a joint function of the goals dictated by a 
specific situation and how those possible goals fit the particular person in 
the situation.36 
Role schemas organize our knowledge about the roles people play 
in society and our expectations for appropriate behavior based on those 
 
 30. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 171. 
 31. Id. at 149. 
 32. Id. at 150. 
 33. Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 452 (1999). 
 34. Id. at 453. 
 35. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 150. 
 36. Id. 
652 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:643 
 
roles.37 For example, someone would expect her accountant to ask to see 
a copy of her prior tax returns, but she would be surprised if her doctor 
made the same request; conversely, she would be shocked if her 
accountant attempted to take her temperature. The characteristics that 
shape role schemas can develop through the effort or achievement of the 
individual (such as a person’s experience or profession), or through 
immutable characteristics (such as race, sex, or age). All of these 
characteristics have corresponding role-based expectations for appropriate 
behavior, organized in the observer’s mind as role schemas.38 
Event schemas, also known as scripts, are structures that describe the 
appropriate or expected sequence of events in well-known situations like a 
visit to a doctor’s office, a restaurant, or a sporting event.39 These schemas 
contain beliefs about the sequence of actions and events that typically 
occur in particular situations; they allow us to abstract procedures and 
complex sequences of behaviors from our everyday experiences and apply 
those to our understanding of new experiences.40 In one study designed 
to determine if there were widely shared scripts for different types of 
robberies, subjects were asked to write a list of actions describing a 
typical act of a robbery of a convenience store.41 Ninety-six percent 
included “enter store,” 90% included “look around (once in store),” 90% 
included “go to the cash register,” 99% included “demand money,” and 
96% included “exit store.”42 A majority of the subjects in the study 
therefore held similar beliefs about the sequence of actions that typically 
occurred in a convenience store robbery. 
The research on schemas—whether self, person, role, or event—
indicates they all affect our perception of new information, our inferences 
based on that information, and our memories and retrieval of stored 
information.43 Schemas “guide our information seeking. Not only do 
schema[s] tell us what to see, but they also tell us where to see it.”44 We 
do not notice or attend to all of the information we encounter, but only 
 
 37. Id. at 159. 
 38. Id. at 160. A stereotype is a type of role schema, one that comprises our knowledge, beliefs, 
and expectations about a particular social group. David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, 
Stereotypes, in Handbook of Social Cognition 168 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d 
ed. 1994). Social stereotypes exist for all groups, not just racial minorities, and correspond to the 
beliefs and expectations we have about particular groups. We have role schemas and stereotypes for 
teachers, gang members, ball players, religious fundamentalists, and politicians. Once a person is 
categorized, she becomes another example of the schema and is assigned the characteristics and traits 
of others within her same social group. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 161. 
 39. Jean Matter Mandler, Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Schema Theory 75 (1984). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Valerie Fisher Holst & Kathy Pezdek, Scripts for Typical Crimes and Their Effects on 
Memory for Eyewitness Testimony, 6 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 573, 578–79 (1992). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 150. 
 44. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in Handbook of Social Cognition, 
supra note 38, at 161, 179–80. 
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deal with that which is important or useful, and schemas tell us what is 
important or useful.45 Next, schemas allow us to draw inferences about 
what happened in the past and what is likely to happen in the future.46 
Finally, schemas help determine what we remember about what happens 
around us. We are more likely to remember schema-relevant or schema-
consistent information and to disregard that which does not fit into an 
existing schema.47 
B. Schema Activation: Priming and Framing 
After schemas have developed, they are available for use in new 
situations, existing in a sort of resting state, waiting to be cued.48 But what 
determines which of the many relevant and available schemas will be 
activated in a particular situation? When meeting a new co-worker, a 
person could characterize her as a Southerner, a professor, a woman, or a 
colleague. Although she may be all of these things, a variety of factors 
influence the schemas that will be activated and applied when the person 
meets the new co-worker, among them the recency with which a schema 
has been activated in the past and the frequency with which it has been 
activated (the priming effect).49 Likewise, the way in which the encounter 
has been framed also influences what schemas are activated.50 
Priming has a powerful influence on which schemas are activated in 
particular situations. Ideas that have been recently and frequently 
activated will be more easily recalled than those that have not.51 Similarly, 
schema activation is determined partly by how recently or frequently a 
particular schema has been activated in the past.52 Moreover, once a 
schema is activated, or “primed,” for one purpose, it becomes more 
accessible, and its likelihood of being used in the interpretation and 
organization of subsequent information is similarly increased.53 If the 
person in the previous paragraph had watched Gone With the Wind on 
television the night before, for example, she would be more likely to 
characterize her new colleague as a Southerner, in addition to 
characterizing her as a professor. 
 
 45. Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1 
Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium 89, 90 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981). 
 46. Id. at 97–98. 
 47. Id. at 98. 
 48. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 175. 
 49. Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the 
Interpretation of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 1660, 1661 (1979); see Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 181. 
 50. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 181. 
 51. Id. at 231. 
 52. Id. at 181. 
 53. Srull & Wyer, supra note 49, at 1661–62. 
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Exposure to words, people, or physical objects can activate schemas, 
even without the perceiver’s conscious awareness.54 In one study, subjects 
believed they were participating in a sentence scrambling exercise. 
Subjects were first told to ask the experimenter for a second task after 
they had completed the sentence scramble.55 Researchers then primed the 
subjects with words associated with being “rude” (such as “aggressively,” 
“disturb,” “intrude,” “obnoxious,” and “bluntly”), words associated with 
being “polite” (such as “respect,” “unobtrusively,” “cordially,” and 
“behave”), or neutral words (such as “send,” “clear,” “gives,” “flawlessly,” 
and “practiced”).56 After subjects completed the sentence scramble, 
researchers measured how many seconds it took the subjects to interrupt a 
conversation between the experimenter and a confederate and ask for 
the second task.57 The subjects exposed to the rude priming conditions 
interrupted significantly faster (averaging 326 seconds) than the 
participants in the polite (558 seconds) or neutral (519 seconds) groups.58 
In a similar study, participants exposed to words related to the elderly 
(such as “Florida,” “bingo,” and “retired”) were timed walking to the 
elevator after completing the sentence scramble.59 They walked more 
slowly than those participants who had been exposed to neutral words 
(such as “thirsty,” “clean,” and “private”).60 The words, therefore, 
activated schemas that in turn actually influenced the behavior of the 
subjects. 
Like priming, the framing of information activates schemas that 
influence the categories we apply and the inferences and decisions we 
make. “Framing is the process by which a communication source 
constructs and defines a social or political issue for its audience.”61 
 
 54. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 315. Of course, listeners can be primed by more than one 
message. If a listener is more influenced by the first message she hears, this is the result of the primacy 
effect; if instead, the listener is more influenced by the second, different message, this is the result of 
the recency effect. Curtis P. Haugtvedt & Duane T. Wegener, Message Order Effects in Persuasion: An 
Attitude Strength Perspective, 21 J. Consumer Res. 205, 205 (1994). In studies measuring the point in a 
trial at which jurors are most influenced by incriminating evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the results 
have been mixed, with some studies finding a larger primacy effect, and others a more significant 
recency effect. Kristi A. Costabile & Stanley B. Klein, Finishing Strong: Recency Effects in Juror 
Judgments, 27 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 47, 56 (2005). It does seem that the recency effect might 
slightly outweigh the primacy effect—in other words, jurors are more likely to be influenced by 
information they hear most recently—though this could be due to the jurors’ ability to remember that 
information because they heard it most recently. Id. at 56. 
 55. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and 
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 230, 234 (1996). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 236.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 Pol. Behav. 221, 221 
(1997). 
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Cognitive linguist George Lakoff offers a definition that is closer to a 
traditional definition of schemas, describing frames as “the mental 
structures that allow human beings to understand reality—and 
sometimes to create what we take to be reality.”62 People use frames to 
understand the facts they encounter; as Lakoff notes, facts “need a 
context.”63 Frames help contextualize and influence our understanding of 
everything from social institutions (in a frame for a local school board, 
there are elected officials who make important decisions about 
educational policy) to individual words (“pro-choice” or “pro-life”). The 
activation of a particular frame can predispose people to particular 
preferences and decisions.64 
Frames also help shape and define issues. “An issue-defining frame 
characterizes the problem, assigns blame, and constrains the possible 
solutions. . . . [Frames] block relevant concerns if those concerns are 
outside of the frame.”65 Is it a “war on terror” or a “war for oil”? Framing 
played a big role in shaping public opinion over the Obama 
Administration’s proposed rule requiring religiously affiliated 
organizations’ insurance companies to pay for free birth control for those 
organizations’ employees. In one national poll, when asked if employers 
should be required to offer free birth control to employees, respondents 
favored the rule by a margin of 53% to 33%.66 But when the same 
respondents were asked whether the government should mandate that 
the Catholic Church and other religiously affiliated hospitals and colleges 
offer birth control paid for by the institutions’ insurance companies, 
respondents opposed the rule by a margin of 45% to 38%.67 In other 
words, when the issue was framed as one of access to birth control, 
respondents approved of the rule, but they disapproved of the same rule 
when it was framed as an attack on religious freedom.68 
 
 62. George Lakoff, Thinking Points: Communicating Our American Values and Vision 25 
(2006); see Danielle Kie Hart, In a Word, 41 Sw. L. Rev. 215, 217 (2012) (“A ‘frame’ is variously 
defined as: a structured understanding[] of the way aspects of the world function[,] an interpretive 
schema that enable[s] individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life 
space and the world at large[,] a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and 
suggesting what is at issue[,] and a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning; it 
suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue[.] At its most basic, therefore, a ‘frame’ 
is a tool that enables people to make sense of the world around them.” (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 63. Lakoff, supra note 62, at 10. 
 64. James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23 Pol. 
Behav. 225, 228–29 (2001) (discussing Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment, in which subjects 
changed their preferences for an identical program to combat a disease by 50% depending on whether 
the program was framed in terms of saving lives or the number of people dying). 
 65. Lakoff, supra note 62, at 31–32. 
 66. Gerald F. Seib, Birth-Control Rule Debate Intensifying, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303717304577279831635250306.html. 
 67. Id. 
 68. My own use of the words “access” and “attack” in this sentence further frame the issue. 
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The framing of an issue can constrain people’s abilities to solve 
problems, and jurors are just as susceptible to this effect as anyone else. 
As Brest and Krieger note, a “particular frame inevitably provides only 
one of a number of possible views of reality and implicitly blocks the 
consideration of alternative perspectives with other possible solutions.”69 
The problem, as the authors describe it, is that the decisionmaker thinks 
she is seeing all sides of the problem because the frame itself “is often 
invisible: You have the illusion that you’re seeing the world ‘just as it is,’ 
and it is difficult to imagine that there could be another way to view it.”70 
C. The Perseverance Effect, Confirmation Bias, and Biased 
Assimilation 
Schemas are resilient; once formed, people’s beliefs about themselves, 
others, and the things they see in the world are often unaffected—or only 
slightly affected—by logical challenges.71 This is known as the 
“perseverance effect”: Schemas help us process information more 
efficiently, and that benefit would be lost if people changed their schemas 
to fit every new situation.72 Once schemas are established, they persist, 
often in the face of evidence to the contrary or explicit instructions to 
disregard them, and there even appears to be a biological basis for this 
perseverance effect.73 
In fact, schemas persevere even when people are told the evidence 
in support of the schema is false.74 In a study demonstrating this effect, 
subjects were asked to review two suicide notes and determine which one 
was real and which was fake.75 After completing the task, the subjects 
were given false feedback: Irrespective of actual performance, some were 
told they had performed much better than average, while others were 
told they performed the same as, or worse than average.76 The subjects 
were then “debriefed,” at which point it “was carefully explained that 
their putative performance had been determined before they entered the 
 
 69. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 35. 
 70. Id. In discussing the effect of frames on outcomes, the authors describe an experiment where 
American college students, Israeli pilots, and their flying instructors played a Prisoner’s Dilemma type 
game, where participants choose whether to participate or defect. Those who were told the exercise 
was a “Wall Street Game” were more likely to defect than those who were told it was “Community 
Game.” Id. (citing Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations 
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. Bull. 1175, 1175–85 (2004)). 
 71. Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the 
Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 Soc. Cognition 126, 126 (1982). 
 72. Id. at 127.  
 73. See infra text accompanying notes 102–108. 
 74. Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional 
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 880, 880 (1975). 
 75. Id. at 882. 
 76. Id. 
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experiment, that they had received feedback unrelated to their actual 
performance, and that the deception had been necessary in terms of the 
purported rationale for the study.”77 Despite this thorough debriefing, 
subjects who were initially told they performed above average continued 
to believe that their performance had been above average and that their 
future performance on a similar task would similarly remain above 
average.78 In fact, “the greater the subject’s apparent initial success, the 
higher were the scores she estimated for past and future performances.”79 
Furthermore, when people draw causal connections among pieces of 
information, the perseverance effect becomes even stronger.80 In a study 
on debiasing,81 subjects were given case histories of two firefighters.82 
Each case history included information about the firefighter’s preference 
for risk and his job performance.83 Some subjects were led to believe in a 
positive relationship between risk preference and firefighting ability 
(those with high risk preference were successful firemen, while those 
with low risk preference were unsuccessful), while others were led to 
believe in a negative relationship (those with high risk preference were 
unsuccessful, while those with low risk preference were successful).84 
Subjects then wrote an explanation of the relationship about which they 
had learned.85 
When later debriefed and told that the case histories were fictitious 
and that there was no relationship between risk preference and success as 
a firefighter, subjects continued to hold their initial beliefs: Those initially 
told of a positive relationship tended to keep that belief, and those initially 
told of a negative relationship were more likely to keep that belief, even in 
the face of disconfirming evidence.86 More significantly, however, subjects 
whose explanations referred to causal scenarios (that is, “firefighting is 
risky, so people who prefer risk will be better firefighters”) displayed 
more perseverance in their initial theories than those whose explanation 
just restated the information in the case history.87 
When faced with information that might challenge their existing 
schemas, this perseverance effect is so strong that people tend to devote 
less attention to examining the contradictory information88 or ignore those 
 
 77. Id. at 884. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Anderson, supra note 71, at 127. 
 81. “Debiasing” is the correction or removal of bias. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans et al., Debiasing by 
Instruction: The Case of Belief Bias, 6 Eur. J. Cognitive Psychol. 263, 264 (1994). 
 82. Anderson, supra note 71, at 127. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 127–28. 
 88. Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria 
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inconsistencies or exceptions.89 This tendency is known as “confirmation 
bias,” and it affects the ways in which people seek out and evaluate 
information.90 Furthermore, due to a phenomenon known as “biased 
assimilation,” when people evaluate new information, that evaluation is 
influenced by the extent to which the information is consistent or 
inconsistent with the person’s expectations about the information.91 In 
other words, when “we come across evidence that supports our desired 
conclusions, we may accept it at face value. But when we come across 
comparable evidence that challenges our desired conclusions, we may 
evaluate it more critically and work hard to refute it.”92 
In a study examining confirmation bias and biased assimilation, 
opponents and proponents of capital punishment read about two studies: 
One suggested that capital punishment was effective as a deterrent, and 
the other suggested that it was not effective.93 Both opponents and 
proponents of capital punishment thought the study that confirmed their 
beliefs was more effective than the study that disconfirmed their beliefs.94 
In a similar study, researchers found that when examining evidence that 
is incompatible with their prior beliefs, people invest greater effort in 
evaluating the incompatible evidence than in evaluating any compatible 
evidence, and they devote their efforts toward refuting arguments 
challenging their own position.95 
Furthermore, attempting to prevent schema activation—or telling 
people to disregard schemas—does not appear to diminish the effect of 
schemas on decisionmaking.96 In a study examining this effect, Vicki 
Smith attempted to prevent schema application by withholding from 
jurors the name of the crime with which the defendant was charged.97 
Smith’s hypothesis was that without the retrieval cue (the name of the 
crime), the subjects would not be able to access schemas about that crime 
 
for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 568, 569 (1992). 
 89. Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 19 Advances in 
Experimental Soc. Psychol. 41, 42 (1986). 
 90. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Psychology for Lawyers: Understanding 
the Human Factors in Negotiation, Litigation, and Decision Making 15 (2012). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Kunda, supra note 33, at 230. 
 93. Each argument included a description of the design of the study and was followed by 
criticisms of the study itself and rebuttals of those criticisms. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased 
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered 
Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098, 2100–01 (1979). 
 94. Furthermore, the “net effect of exposing proponents and opponents of capital punishment to 
identical evidence—studies ostensibly offering equivalent levels of support and disconfirmation—was 
to increase further the gap between their views.” Id. at 2105. 
 95. This result is known as the “prior belief effect.” Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A 
Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 5, 14 (1996). 
 96. Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 Law 
& Hum. Behav. 507 (1993). 
 97. Id. at 532. 
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and would instead have to rely on the jury instructions for guidance.98 
The results showed, however, that when jurors were not given the crime 
name, they simply applied their own crime name and accessed their 
schema for that crime.99 In the same study, Smith explicitly told jurors to 
disregard their preexisting notions of the crime and to rely only on the 
judge’s instructions.100 This did not work either. The instruction had no 
effect on decisionmaking, and subjects relied on their preexisting 
knowledge of the crime.101 
Finally, it seems that the perseverance effect may be biologically 
based.102 In a 2005 study, researchers wanted to determine the extent to 
which people pay attention to and assimilate evidence that is consistent 
with their beliefs about the objects under consideration, and the extent to 
which they treat inconsistent evidence as erroneous.103 Earlier studies in 
behavioral and cognitive neuroscience indicated that different brain 
networks are invoked during learning104 than during error detection and 
conflict monitoring.105 The authors found that when people considered 
evidence that was consistent with their beliefs, the brain regions associated 
with learning and memory were significantly activated. When the evidence 
was inconsistent with their beliefs, areas associated with error detection 
and conflict resolution were activated.106 The authors concluded from this 
that people’s beliefs and expectations may act as a “biological filter,” 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; see Anderson, supra note 71. In his discussion of the results of the firefighter experiment, 
Anderson noted that we could try to prevent jurors from creating causal explanations or theories, but 
[s]uch a suggestion is as undesirable as it is impossible. Many of our theories are quite 
useful, both as information organizers and as predictive tools. The problem lies not in our 
propensity to create theories, but in our underestimation of how easy it is to create plausible 
theories for any particular set of events we wish to explain. 
Anderson, supra note 71, at 128. 
 102. Researchers have recently been able to expand the scope of the study of decisionmaking using 
advanced functional brain imaging techniques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(“fMRI”). Using these new techniques, researchers can observe first-hand how the brain responds 
during complex reasoning. Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience 
Framework for Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law, Law and the Brain 161 (Semir Zeki & 
Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). In these studies, subjects typically participate in one task that involves 
a specific reasoning process (deductive reasoning or analogical reasoning), and a second control task 
that contains most of the same visual and cognitive stimulation, but not the specific reasoning process. 
Researchers can then contrast the areas of the brain activated during the specific reasoning task and 
the control task to measure unique brain activity associated with the specific reasoning task. Id. 
Fugelsang and Dunbar approached their research slightly differently by using fMRI to examine the 
areas of the brain that are activated when subjects are presented with evidence that is either consistent 
or inconsistent with their own beliefs. Id. 
 103. Id. at 161. 
 104. Id. (citing various studies). 
 105. Id. (citing various studies). 
 106. Id. at 162. 
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causing the person to employ learning mechanisms when confronted with 
evidence consistent with their beliefs, and error detection mechanisms 
when that evidence is inconsistent.107 
That jurors do not evaluate evidence in a vacuum will come as no 
surprise to judges or lawyers or to anyone who has served on a jury. What 
is perhaps surprising is that this inability to separate personal beliefs from 
evidence is so pervasive and in fact has a neural signature. People, 
therefore, may be unable to set aside beliefs and expectations when 
making decisions or judgments. Furthermore, other findings have 
demonstrated that people may be similarly unable to measure the extent 
to which beliefs and expectations influenced their evaluation of statistical 
evidence.108 
D. Expert v. Novice Schemas 
In many cases, jurors have limited exposure to legal concepts 
through television and movies and little actual legal knowledge.109 So 
while these legal novices have schemas for ideas and concepts they have 
encountered in the past, they will not typically have appropriate schemas110 
for any of the legal concepts or rules they will hear during a trial. This is in 
contrast to the judge, lawyers, and often the parties, who will have more 
developed schemas for the concepts in the trial. Generally, well-developed 
schemas (expert schemas) tend to be more complex, better organized, and 
therefore more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment and 
better decisionmaking.111 
Similarly, mature schemas are likely to be more complex and more 
organized than immature ones.112 In a study investigating how conceptual 
knowledge structures (or schemas) differ between novices and experts, 
researchers compared the approaches of novices (first-year law students) 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 163. 
 109. Of course, this is not always the case. In many states, even judges are required to sit on juries 
when called, though they are sometimes granted hardship exemptions. Jean Guccione, More Judges 
Answering Call for Jury Duty, L.A. Times, June 3, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/03/local/ 
me-6028. Most notably, Justice Elena Kagan was recently called for jury duty in D.C. Superior Court, 
though her number was not called and she was released from service. Keith L. Alexander, Elena 
Kagan Not Selected for Jury Duty, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crime-
scene/keith-l-alexander/elena-kagan-reports-for-jury-d.html. This practice raises other issues of 
“strong” jurors and their impact on juror decisionmaking that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 110. Though they may have inappropriate schemas gleaned from television and other sources, 
much has been made in the law and the media of this “CSI Effect.” See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel 
Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1335 (2009); Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About Forensic Science, The New 
Yorker (May 7, 2007), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/05/07/070507fa_fact 
_toobin. 
 111. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 173. 
 112. Id.  
April 2013]     SCHEMAS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 661 
 
and experts in civil law to two tasks: a card-sorting task and a concept-
elaboration task.113 The card-sorting task, which asked participants to sort 
different cards into groups based on different legal concepts, was 
designed to provide insight into “differences in the organisation of 
conceptual knowledge of individuals at different levels of expertise.”114 
The concept-elaboration task, which asked participants to list everything 
they knew about a particular topic in a short amount of time (two to 
three minutes), was designed to provide insight into the participants’ 
depth of knowledge about the concepts and associations they made with 
other concepts.115 
As expected, the experts’ schemas were highly developed and 
elaborate, which allowed them to “effectively and efficiently interpret 
information or problems that they [were] confronted with.”116 In contrast, 
the novices, who lacked these developed mental frameworks for the law, 
employed problem schemas that consisted of “loosely linked, incomplete, 
and sometimes incorrect knowledge.”117 The novices’ schemas were also 
less easily activated than the experts’, and—when activated—the novices’ 
schemas were less efficient at problem solving:118 “All other things being 
equal, greater complexity moderates judgment. The more variety one has 
encountered, the more complex the issues, the less clear-cut it all seems, 
and the less extreme one’s judgment.”119 
Knowledge, therefore, becomes more structured and more accessible 
with increasing expertise.120 When asked to group similar concepts in the 
card-sorting task, experts used the same central legal concepts to create 
clusters, while novices strung concepts together somewhat randomly and 
reported no meaningful connections between the concepts.121 As a result of 
this better organization, experts notice, recall, and use information that is 
inconsistent with their schemas more than novices do,122 while the novices’ 
simpler, less-developed schemas limit them to more obvious, schema-
 
 113. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1047. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1046. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. As expected, in the card-sorting task, experts used more central concepts when clustering 
concepts, while novices ordered their concepts more randomly. Id. at 1055. In the concept-elaboration 
task, experts used more legal definitions in their explanations of a particular concept, including 
examples from cases, while novices used more everyday examples. Id. at 1056. 
 119. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 173–74. 
 120. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1058. 
 121. Id. This suggests that the schemas of novices, even when analyzing the same information, are 
very different from each other. Individuals with greater expertise in law, however, have a more similar 
knowledge base—and therefore more similar schemas—than those with less expertise. Id. 
 122. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 174. 
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consistent material.123 Experts are therefore better able to moderate 
inconsistencies and to make more focused judgments and decisions.124 
II.  Why We Need to Go Beyond “Plain-Language” Instructions 
Because most jurors have some prior knowledge of the law (and 
because some may have quite a bit), they approach jury instructions with 
an established schema in place—though it may not be a legally correct 
schema—and their interpretation of the instructions they receive is 
necessarily influenced by that schema. For example, when people in a 
study were asked to list characteristics of robbery, 75% said that 
“something of value is taken,” 73% said that the “perpetrator is armed,” 
and 31% said that the crime “occurs in a home/apartment.”125 Robbery 
does involve the taking of property from the victim by force or threat of 
force, but it does not require that the property be valuable, that the 
perpetrator be armed, or that the location be someone’s home.126 
An individual juror might therefore have a schema for robbery that 
includes an armed perpetrator. Due to the perseverance effect, that 
schema will influence the facts the juror notices and remembers when she 
is presented with the evidence, and the schema will not always go away 
when the juror enters the jury room to make a decision. This result occurs 
even if—before she begins deliberations—the juror has been given plainly 
written jury instructions that do not include an armed perpetrator.127 This 
is especially true because the juror will not typically receive the 
instructions containing the legally correct definition of robbery until after 
she has seen—and likely already begun to evaluate—all of the evidence 
in the case. That evidence will therefore have been viewed within the 
context of her preexisting (and incorrect) schema for robbery. 
Moreover, because the average juror has little experience in “the 
law,” even plain-language instructions can contain unfamiliar terms, or 
terms used in a way with which the juror has no experience. Thus the 
juror faces an additional hurdle: She must first familiarize herself with 
the “official” use of legal language before she can begin to interpret the 
plain-language instructions she has been given.128 This is especially 
difficult in law because precise language is so important. Judges and 
lawyers share a common language gained through legal education and 
practice, but jurors often lack that shared understanding and instead 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857, 868 (1991). 
 126. Id. at 861. 
 127. Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48 Am. 
Psychologist 423, 429–30 (1993).  
 128. Lars Lindahl, Deduction and Justification in the Law: The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts, 
17 Ratio Juris. 182, 182 (2004). 
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incorporate their everyday knowledge and understanding of concepts 
into their interpretation and application of legal rules to the facts of a 
particular case.129 
Furthermore, some concepts in the law function as “intermediate” 
concepts, which means that their meaning is flexible and determined by 
the situation or the facts.130 For example, the legal term “ownership” has 
a different meaning in the context of an inheritance (which obliges the 
owner to pay inheritance taxes) than in the context of a bicycle received 
from a friend as a gift (which does not oblige the owner to pay taxes). 
The context (facts) determines the legal result and corresponding rights 
and responsibilities. Moreover, the individual juror likely has a schema 
for ownership that is different than either of these legal definitions. 
Similarly, because jurors are presented with arguments from all sides of 
an issue in an adversarial setting, the language and concepts they are 
expected to understand are fluid, and can often be interpreted in 
different ways. Schemas further compound this interpretative problem 
because they influence the jury at every stage of the trial—from the 
attention jurors give the evidence and how they interpret the information 
they see at trial, to the way they interpret and apply the jury instructions 
to that information. 
While rewritten jury instructions have improved juror 
comprehension, schema theory—and specifically the perseverance 
effect—tells us that jurors will still apply existing schemas to those 
rewritten instructions.131 Interestingly, there is little in the social science 
literature examining the impact of schemas on jury decisionmaking when 
jury instructions have been rewritten and made clearer. In one of the few 
studies examining schemas and jury instructions, Smith concluded that 
poor juror comprehension was not the result of poorly drafted instructions, 
but the result of the jurors’ prior knowledge of the law and preexisting 
knowledge frameworks (schemas) interfering with those instructions.132 
Jurors did not discard these frameworks when presented with conflicting 
 
 129. Dan Simon’s scholarship on cognitive coherence suggests that when jurors are asked to apply 
instructions they cannot understand to a set of ambiguous facts, jurors will seek to impose coherence 
on the complex task in front of them. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence 
in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 517 (2004). In doing so, they will reduce the decision 
to one of two alternatives, one of which is supported by strong considerations and one by weak 
considerations. Id. at 516. “Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively complex 
and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident 
conclusions.” Id. at 513. In other words, instead of attempting to decipher confusing and complex 
instructions, jurors will instead distill the complex decision into a simpler decision about which they 
can feel more confident. 
 130. Nievelstein et al., supra note 6, at 1047. 
 131. See Diamond, supra note 127, at 429–30. 
 132. Smith, supra note 125, at 868. Smith argued that jurors have preexisting mental 
representations of the elements of various crimes, but that those concepts do not include the correct 
legal definitions of the crimes. Id. (robbery example). 
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jury instructions, but instead relied on those frameworks when making a 
decision.133 That study was later criticized by Peter English and Bruce 
Sales, who argued that the study presented participants with standard 
pattern jury instructions, instead of instructions that had been rewritten to 
increase comprehension.134 English and Sales concluded that while jurors 
may rely in part on schemas when given incomprehensible instructions, the 
study did not show that jurors will do this when given instructions revised 
according to psycholinguistic principles.135 In other words, given clear 
instructions, they concluded, jurors might be more likely to follow the 
law rather than their preexisting ideas.136 
Other researchers have used schemas to explain jury decisions, even 
though juror comprehension of instructions was not controlled.137 In one 
study, mock jurors given “not guilty by reason of insanity” instructions 
were no more likely to convict or acquit than jurors told to rely on 
common sense.138 The authors concluded that this was the result of the 
jurors’ preconceived constructs or beliefs (schemas) about sanity and 
insanity.139 These constructs, the authors felt, were very strong and often 
more powerful than any new information the jurors might learn through 
jury instructions. The authors suggested that drafters should pay attention 
to these constructs and develop a new insanity test that incorporates both 
psychological and legal definitions of insanity, as well as common sense 
beliefs.140 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. English & Sales, supra note 14, at 381. 
 135. Id. at 390. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe “Insanity”, 13 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 41 (1989) [hereinafter Finkel & Handel, How Jurors]; Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. 
Handel, Jurors and Insanity: Do Test Instructions Instruct? 1 Forensic Rep. 65 (1988) [hereinafter 
Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity]. 
 138. Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity, supra note 137, at 76–77.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Finkel & Handel, How Jurors, supra note 137, at 44; Finkel & Handel, Jurors and Insanity, 
supra note 137, at 67. In a similar study, James Ogloff attempted to determine whether jurors used 
preexisting schemas in determining what elements are important in a determination of legal insanity. 
See generally James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision 
Making, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 509 (1991). Participants were given one of two widely used insanity 
instructions—the M’Naghten or the broader American Law Institute (“ALI”) insanity instructions. 
Both standards had low juror comprehension rates (30.3% for the M’Naghten and 31.4% for the ALI 
standards). Lieberman & Sales, supra note 3, at 620. The study showed, however, that the standard did 
not affect the number of guilty versus not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdicts. Ogloff, supra, at 522. 
Given the low comprehension rate, it appeared that instead of relying on the instructions, jurors used 
schemas to identify elements important in determining insanity, but like the definition of robbery, 
those schematic elements did not match the legal definition of insanity. Id. at 524. For example, 
participants considered “expert psychiatric testimony” and “defendant’s intent to harm” as the most 
important factors. Id. at 521 tbl.4. However, neither framework appears in either the M’Naghten or 
ALI instructions. Furthermore, jurors who were not given any insanity instructions made similar 
verdict choices to those given either set of instructions. Id. at 523. Ogloff recommended either 
developing new standards consistent with jurors’ schemas about insanity, or rewriting the instructions 
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Finally, one study suggests that jurors will continue to adhere to 
preexisting ideas (schemas) even when instructions are written clearly.141 
In that study, researchers compared rates of death sentence imposition 
when “jurors were told that if the defendant were not sentenced to 
death, he would spend an unspecified amount of time in prison or would 
receive life without the possibility of parole” (“LWOP”).142 Although the 
authors expected to find fewer death sentences when the LWOP condition 
was present (because jurors could be certain that defendants would not go 
free), the frequency of death sentences was almost identical in the two 
conditions.143 Data from a manipulation check suggested that the LWOP 
instruction was clear, but it appeared that jurors who were told the 
defendant would receive LWOP relied on their preexisting beliefs that 
LWOP did not really mean a life sentence.144 This prior belief was so 
strongly held that jurors discounted even a clear jury instruction to the 
contrary.145 
Of course, it is not surprising that even rewritten jury instructions 
have a potential vulnerability. As Smith points out, colloquial “terms carry 
colloquial baggage, some possibly correct, some incorrect. Wholesale 
replacement of legal terms with simple language may activate a host of 
associated concepts that are useful for everyday decisionmaking but are 
legally incorrect or irrelevant.”146 In other words, even plain-language 
instructions may contain terms that have different meanings to different 
people, or contain everyday terms that have a specific legal meaning. 
III.  The Importance of the Representative Jury and Special Juries 
as Models for Improvement 
The term “American jury system” includes many distinct jury 
systems. Each state, the federal government, and the District of Columbia 
have their own courts, laws, practices, and multiple jury systems.147 
Moreover, jury systems differ in criminal cases and civil matters. All of 
these systems, however, share some important characteristics. The Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution provides that in “all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
 
to make them more clear. Id. at 527. 
 141. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived 
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 788, 800 (2000) (discussing Shari S. 
Diamond and Jonathan D. Casper’s unpublished study on understanding juries and their adherence to 
preexisting schemas despite clear jury instructions). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 800–01. 
 146. Smith, supra note 125, at 869. Smith’s findings and conclusions were later criticized by Peter 
English and Bruce Sales. See English & Sales, supra note 14. 
 147. Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System 1 (2003). 
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trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . .”148 In civil cases in federal court, the right to a 
jury trial is governed by the Seventh Amendment, which provides that in 
“Suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”149 This 
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases only applies to federal 
cases, but most states afford jury trials in civil matters for cases above the 
level of the small claims court.150 
A fundamental feature of the trial by jury is the requirement that 
the pool of potential jurors should be comprised of a reasonable cross 
section of the community, or a “jury of peers.” Stemming from the 
Magna Carta,151 this ancient notion continues to reverberate today and 
has many goals, among them improving fact finding, reducing prejudice, 
and promoting the legitimacy of the legal system.152 In 1968, the Supreme 
Court noted that providing “an accused with the right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.”153 In practice, courts have often fallen short of this ideal. Women 
and minorities have historically been excluded from juries and only 
began serving in substantial numbers in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.154 Moreover, until the second half of the twentieth century, jury 
service was limited to land owners, further limiting the number of eligible 
jurors.155 
Despite this shaky start, the country eventually moved toward a 
representative jury, one “drawn from a cross-section of the community.”156 
This egalitarian tradition of a jury composed of a cross section of the 
community argues against juries with special skills or special qualifications, 
although there are examples of such “special juries.”157 A special jury is 
one composed of citizens with relevant specialized knowledge that will 
 
 148. U.S. Const. amend VI. The Supreme Court has limited this right by holding that the Sixth 
Amendment does not guarantee jury trials for “petty” offenses, or those carrying a potential 
punishment of less than six months’ imprisonment. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970). 
Since 1968 this constitutional right to a jury trial has applied to both state and federal criminal trials. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 149. U.S. Const. amend VII. 
 150. See Juries In-Depth: Right to a Jury Trial, Am. Judicature Soc’y, http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/ 
jc_right_overview.asp#criminal (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 151. The Magna Carta required that “charges against barons should be heard by other barons, 
their ‘peers,’ rather than by the king.” Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 66. 
 152. Id. at 74–75. 
 153. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 154. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 66. 
 155. James Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special 
Juries 176 (2006). 
 156. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). 
 157. For an excellent discussion of the historical development and current status of the special 
jury, see Oldham, supra note 155. 
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help them to more efficiently solve the facts of a case.158 The earliest 
known special jury convened in 1351, when a jury composed of cooks and 
fishmongers was called to decide the case of a defendant charged with 
selling bad food.159 Another well-known form of the special jury was the 
“jury of matrons,” all-woman juries assembled in cases in which a 
convicted woman awaiting execution “pleaded her belly,” or claimed to 
be pregnant.160 The jury of matrons determined the truth of the claim and 
decided whether the execution should be stayed until the child was 
born.161 
The idea of using experts to resolve disputes has an extensive history 
in the United States. Arbitrators are perhaps the best-known example, but 
experts also make decisions as administrative judges and in specialty 
courts.162 There is also a large body of legal literature discussing the 
constitutionality of dispensing with the jury in complex civil litigation and 
instead employing special juries.163 Although at one time about half of the 
states had some form of special jury statute, today only Delaware has a 
specific statute allowing for special juries in complex civil cases, although 
even there it has become exceedingly rare to call a special jury as many 
special jury requests are rejected due to insufficient complexity.164 Even a 
Delaware court noted that special juries are “contrary to fundamental 
concepts of jury trial and would substitute a method of selection which is 
inconsistent with established principles of justice.”165 
As James Oldham notes, the “idea of drawing exclusive special 
juries from specialized lists seems to be anachronistic today. Elite special 
juries surely are antithetical to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of 
opening up jury service to everyone.”166 Oldham argues that there is still a 
place for special juries, however, and that while the cross section 
requirement meets the goal of keeping citizens involved “in the business of 
democracy,” the special jury serves equally compelling goals, such as 
dealing effectively with complex cases.167 However, he concedes that, for 
 
 158. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 68. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. (noting that, while the use of special juries was fairly common in England in the 1700s, 
their use declined and was abolished in 1949). 
 162. Oldham, supra note 155, at 196. Neither private arbitrators nor administrative judges must 
submit questions of fact to a jury, though specialty courts still must do so. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex 
Civil Litigation, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English 
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 43, 80 (1980); Kenneth S. Klein, 
The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 1005, 
1007 (1992). 
 164. Oldham, supra note 155, at 199. 
 165. Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc., 1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989). 
 166. Oldham, supra note 155, at 177. 
 167. Id. 
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the most part, the argument that a “complexity exception” can be read 
into the Seventh Amendment has not succeeded.168 
In addition to the constitutional hurdles, specialized juries composed 
of experts are contrary to ideals of a representative jury of peers and may 
not promote more accurate fact finding. The representative jury is based 
on the premise that the ordinary citizen is capable of sorting out the details 
of most lawsuits. As Vidmar and Hans note, the “idea of a representative 
jury is a compelling one. A jury of people with a wide range of 
backgrounds, life experiences, and world knowledge will promote accurate 
fact-finding.”169 Diverse groups are likely to hold diverse perspectives on 
the evidence, thereby encouraging more thorough debate.170 Moreover, 
research suggests that diverse juries are better fact finders.171 
Abandoning the representative jury system in favor of a system of 
special juries of experts is an extreme solution, and one that is unlikely to 
find broad support in the courts. Furthermore, there are great benefits to 
a representative jury that would be lost in such a system. A compromise 
position, therefore, is a representative system that attempts to better 
educate lay jurors to make them more like experts, but without 
abandoning the many benefits those lay jurors bring to the evaluation of 
evidence. We can come closer to achieving this ideal by attempting to 
correct and develop the schemas jurors bring with them to trials in order to 
make their decisionmaking processes more efficient, flexible, and legally 
accurate. 
IV.  Recommendations: How to Correct Old Schemas and  
Create New Ones 
Findings in social science suggest that jurors bring existing schemas 
for legal concepts to trials, many of which may be incorrect or 
undeveloped.172 Furthermore, jurors are not typically aware of the extent 
to which these schemas can influence their decisionmaking. Because—
plain or not—jurors cannot separate schemas from their use of jury 
instructions, the goal of jury instructions should be two-fold: first, to give 
jurors the applicable law, and second, to help jurors correct existing 
schemas and develop new and legally correct schemas before they are 
exposed to the evidence in a trial. 
 
 168. Id. at 196. Of course, the complexity exception is not without its supporters. Notably, Judge 
Richard Posner has stated that he would favor a complexity exception in certain “complex commercial 
cases.” Jeffrey Cole, Economics of Law: An Interview with Judge Posner, 22 Litig. 23, 66 (1995). He 
noted: “It’s unfair really to put people through the task of trying to understand a subject which people 
of higher education and intellectual attainment spend a lifetime studying with imperfect 
understanding.” Id. at 67. 
 169. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 74. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 74–75 (citing various studies). 
 172. Smith, supra note 125, at 868. 
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This approach does not envision a system in which we attempt to turn 
jurors into something approximating attorneys, a feat that would be both 
impossible given the time frame and contrary to our system of a 
representative jury. Furthermore, some studies suggest that as attorneys 
gain experience, they actually become worse at evaluating cases because 
they become so rooted in their own preconceptions—or schemas—for 
what the law is and should be.173 Instead, these reworked instructions 
should try to create schemas in jurors that function more like those of 
experts in that they are better organized, and therefore more accessible, 
allowing for more thoughtful judgment and better decisionmaking. In 
this way, we can capture the advantages and ideals of the lay juror, while 
at the same time ensuring more accurate, consistent, and legally 
appropriate decisionmaking. 
We do not—and should not—expect jurors to entirely remove past 
experience and common sense from the equation when making decisions 
about verdicts. While jurors might have traditionally been seen as “blank 
slates” who could simply be instructed to base their decisions solely on 
the permissible evidence and the appropriate legal standard, the social 
science research on both jurors174 and other human decisionmakers175 does 
not support this view. 
In fact, we instruct jurors to take past experiences into account in 
certain contexts. For example, jurors are told to use common sense in 
judging the credibility of witnesses,176 and the doctrine of jury nullification 
allows jurors to acquit criminal defendants who are technically guilty when 
the jury feels the law is either immoral or wrongly applied to the 
defendant.177 Moreover, studies of jury behavior indicate that preexisting 
beliefs often play a role in the jury deliberation process.178 However, 
because many jurors have undeveloped or incorrect schemas for the legal 
concepts they will be asked to apply in a trial, we should correct jurors’ 
 
 173. Randall Kiser, Beyond Right and Wrong: The Power of Effective Decision Making for 
Attorneys and Clients 22 (2010) (citing various studies). Indeed, Kiser notes that attorneys, like 
other highly successful people, “deflect criticism, rarely change their opinions, [and] resist 
feedback . . . . [They] lack self-awareness and resist behavioral changes required to improve their 
problem-solving skills.” Id. at 285. 
 174. See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 13, at 519. 
 175. See, e.g., Paul T. P. Wong & Bernard Weiner, When People Ask “Why” Questions, and the 
Heuristics of Attributional Search, 40 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 650, 661–62 (1981). 
 176. See, e.g., 2.260 Credibility of Witnesses, Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions 
(2009) (instructing jurors to “look at all the evidence, drawing on your own common sense and 
experience of life”). 
 177. Vidmar & Hans, supra note 10, at 227. As James Oldham describes the process of jury 
nullification, the doctrine stems from the idea that the “the jury should have the power to decide the 
law by ignoring it.” Oldham, supra note 155, at 25. 
 178. Vicki L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People's 
Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 Law & Hum. Behav. 517, 528–29 (1996) 
(finding that jurors’ prior knowledge about the elements of crimes influences information processing 
and decisionmaking). 
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misunderstandings about the law and create legally appropriate and 
accurate schemas before jurors are told about the facts of the case. To do 
this, we need to efficiently train jurors to use the law and facts, and 
educational psychology can help inform this effort. Additionally, we can 
help jurors overcome the schema-perseverance effect and reduce bias by 
asking them to be aware of their own decisionmaking processes. 
A. Developing Jurors’ Schemas to Make Them Legally Accurate 
One of the goals of jury instructions should be to develop novice 
jurors’ schemas for the legal concepts they are about to apply to the facts 
during the trial. We can increase efficient learning in several ways, both 
by giving jurors simple and straightforward explanations of the legal 
concepts they will be asked to apply, and by allowing jurors to study 
worked examples of those legal concepts and build new schemas before 
they are asked to interpret law and facts. In turn, these schemas will be 
more structured and more accessible to the jurors during the trial and 
during deliberations, leading to better judgment and better outcomes. 
Juror schema development and learning must be efficient—not only 
because the nature of a trial does not allow for drawn-out juror 
education—but also because efficient learning leads to better learning 
outcomes with less mental effort.179 All human learning relies on both 
working memory and long-term memory.180 When people are in learning 
mode, new information is processed in the working memory and forms 
schemas that are then stored in long-term memory.181 Working memory is 
mainly a storage place for conscious processing; it does not have the 
capacity to store more than limited amounts of information.182 If we ask 
jurors to learn too much too quickly (that is, all of the law and the facts 
they are being asked to interpret), we will overwhelm their working 
memory and shut down new learning.183 This is especially true because, as 
novices, jurors have fewer developed schemas for the concepts they are 
learning, and they can easily be overwhelmed with the cognitive demands 
of building new schemas.184 
To help jurors counteract inappropriate preexisting schemas and 
activate legally appropriate ones, we should provide them with pre-trial 
explanations of the applicable law. Traditionally, the only instruction that 
jurors receive on the applicable law are the jury instructions themselves, 
and typical instructions are taken from statutes or cases; even pattern jury 
 
 179. Ruth Clark et al., Efficiency in Learning: Evidence-Based Guidelines to Manage 
Cognitive Load 27 (2006). 
 180. Id. at 28. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 29. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 32. 
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instructions, intended to be clearer and more accessible for the average 
layperson, are still written by lawyers—experts—in language that makes 
sense to experts.185 But experts and novices do not deal with new 
information or learn in the same way, and when experts serve as 
instructors, “they often overload their learners by failing to compensate for 
the much more limited schemas of the learners.”186 Because the novice 
does not have relevant schemas for the law, the pre-trial explanation 
should serve the role that existing schemas would serve for the expert, or 
the lawyers and judges.187 
Moreover, this explanation should move beyond the jury instructions 
themselves and give new jurors a brief, introductory overview of the legal 
issues. The explanation should incorporate strategies for teaching novice 
learners—including tactics like organizing sentences that preview and then 
review the content of the explanation, definitions and examples of 
unfamiliar terms, explicit statements that require minimal inferences, and 
headers to signal paragraph topics.188 These “pre-instructions” will help 
give jurors an overview of the applicable law and help them redefine and 
better develop their schemas for the issues they are about to examine 
during the trial. As a result, jurors’ schemas will be more accessible, and 
jurors will be more flexible in their thinking and less swayed by 
unconscious biases. 
Furthermore, novices will learn more efficiently if they are given 
worked examples or a step-by-step explanation of the solution to a 
problem that help them build new schemas.189 Because novices lack 
 
 185. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012); Tiersma, supra note 7, at 1088. 
 186. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 33. 
 187. Id. at 251. 
 188. Id. at 259. 
 189. Id. at 32, 190. In fact, some states do include examples in some types of jury instructions. For 
example, the state of Connecticut explains the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence 
this way: 
  Circumstantial evidence of an event is the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of 
certain facts or evidence or the happening of other events from which you may logically 
conclude that the event in question did happen. By way of example, let us assume that it is a 
December night and you’re preparing to retire for the evening. You look out the window 
and you see it is snowing. You wake up the next morning, come to court, and testify that the 
night before it was snowing in the area of your house. That is direct evidence of the fact that 
it snowed the night before. You saw it and you came into court and testified to that fact. 
  Now assume that it is another December night, the weather is clear, there is no snow on 
the ground, and you retire for the evening. You wake up the next morning, you look out the 
window and you see snow on the ground and footprints across your lawn. You come into 
court and you testify to those facts. The evidence that the night before there was no snow on 
the ground and the next morning there was snow on the ground and footprints across your 
lawn is direct evidence. That direct evidence, however, is circumstantial evidence of the fact 
that some time during the night it snowed and that some time thereafter someone walked 
across your lawn. 
Criminal Jury Instructions: 2.4-1 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, State of Conn. Judicial Branch 
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schemas for new concepts, they need learning environments that 
compensate for that deficiency; this type of learning environment would 
provide schema substitutes by optimizing jurors’ limited working 
memories in ways that free working memory for learning. The use of 
examples is especially helpful for novice learners—like the average juror—
who know little about the legal issue they are being asked to analyze 
because the examples will help them develop schemas and accelerate 
expertise.190 If jurors have a worked example to study just prior to solving 
a similar problem (that is, the problem of how the law applies to the 
particular facts in a trial), this will give them an analogy to use when 
solving the problem, thus freeing up more working memory capacity for 
schema development.191 
The Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 501 for “Proximate Cause” is 
an example of a pattern jury instruction that could be rewritten to include 
both an introductory explanation to the legal issue, as well as worked 
examples of how the law would apply to a particular set of facts. The 
instruction states: “The law frequently uses the expression ‘proximate 
cause,’ with which you may not be familiar. When I use the expression 
‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause which, in a natural and continuous 
sequence, produces damage and without which the damage would not 
have occurred.”192 
Of course, “proximate” and “cause” are words that are familiar to 
most jurors, but the term “proximate cause” has a legal definition that is 
much different than its common usage. The legal concept of proximate 
cause is really one of policy and whether there is enough of a connection 
between the act and the harm that it is fair to hold the defendant liable 
for the harm: To satisfy proximate cause, it must have been reasonably 
foreseeable that the harm would result from the action.193 Because of this 
 
(June 13, 2008), http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.4-1.htm. This is likely to be more helpful to a 
juror than the Ninth Circuit’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which provide: 
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as 
testimony by a witness about what that witness personally saw or heard or did. 
Circumstantial evidence is proof of one or more facts from which you could find another 
fact. You should consider both kinds of evidence. The law makes no distinction between the 
weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide how 
much weight to give to any evidence. 
3.8 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions (Mar. 2006), 
http://archive.ca9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/0/daf5c7758d60a2ed882564b4000844cf?OpenDocument. 
Comments to the pattern jury instruction do note that it may be helpful to include an illustrative 
example. Id. 
 190. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 193–94, 201. 
 191. Id. at 193. 
 192. 501 Proximate Cause—Concurring Proximate Cause—Definition, Arkansas Model Jury 
Instructions—Civil (updated Nov. 2011). 
 193. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (“[B]ecause of convenience, of 
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond 
a certain point.”). 
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difference between its common usage and its legal usage, jurors will 
likely need a corrected schema for this term, and examples of how the 
term plays out in the legal context will be helpful in creating a legally 
appropriate schema for “proximate cause.” Jurors should be told the rule 
and the reasoning for the proximate cause requirement and given an 
example of how the rule can be used to solve a specific problem before 
they are told about the facts of the present case. Here is a hypothetical: 
Rule and reasoning for “proximate cause”: The next requirement for 
negligence is that the defendant’s action be the “proximate cause” of 
the plaintiff’s injury. Proximate cause means that at the time he took 
the action, the defendant must have been reasonably able to predict 
that the harm to the plaintiff would result from his action; in other 
words, the harm must have been reasonably foreseeable. This 
requirement is in addition to the requirement that the defendant’s 
actions be the “cause in fact” of the plaintiff’s injury (see previous 
instruction on “cause in fact”). We have this requirement because we 
do not think it is fair to hold people liable for every consequence of 
their actions, if that consequence is too improbable or far-reaching. 
You should find proximate cause in the following example: If Margot 
throws a book at Steve’s head, it is reasonably foreseeable that 
Margot’s action could proximately cause Steve harm. Furthermore, if 
Margot throws a book at Steve’s head, but it misses and knocks an 
object off of the shelf, which then hits Steve in the head, it is also 
reasonably foreseeable that Margot’s action could proximately cause 
Steve harm. Therefore, in both situations, when Margot threw the 
book, she proximately caused Steve’s harm. 
You should NOT find proximate cause in the following example: 
Margot, driving carelessly, crashes into Steve’s car. Margot didn’t know 
that the car contained a bomb, which exploded when she hit it. Several 
blocks away, a mother carrying her baby, Chad, is startled by the 
explosion and drops Chad. In this situation, Chad cannot recover 
against Margot because Chad’s injury is so removed from Margot’s 
action that her harm was not reasonably foreseeable. Margot’s action 
was not the proximate cause of Chad’s injury. Note that in this example 
Margot has been negligent (because she was driving carelessly), and 
her careless driving is the “cause in fact” of Chad’s injury (because if 
she hadn’t been negligent, the crash and the explosion would not have 
occurred). However, we do not want to hold Margot liable for Chad’s 
injury because it is so improbable and far-reaching that it would not be 
fair.194 
As noted above, this explanation should be given before the 
presentation of evidence. Because jury instructions are typically given 
after the presentation of evidence and just prior to deliberation, jurors 
have already had the evidence framed for them and have already been 
primed to view it in a particular (or several different) ways.195 These 
 
 194. See generally id.; see also Steven L. Emanuel, Emanuel Law Outlines: Torts 148–49 (8th 
ed. 2009). 
 195. See discussion on priming and framing supra Part I.B. 
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primes and frames activate schemas that, as noted above, may or may not 
be legally correct or appropriate. In many cases, they are likely activating 
schemas in jurors that include misconceptions about the law and, once 
activated, these schemas will persevere throughout the trial and into 
deliberations. If courts incorporated a more neutral, pre-trial explanation 
of the law, this neutral and legally correct information would also have a 
priming and framing effect, creating and activating appropriate schemas 
and allowing jurors to better weigh the evidence from both sides. 
Judges have discretion to determine the timing of jury instructions, 
and some judges give jurors instructions before the presentation of 
evidence so that jurors will have some prior understanding of the law they 
will later be asked to apply.196 Research on schema theory supports this 
approach: People are more likely to remember information relevant to 
schemas,197 and—as a result of both priming and framing—context affects 
people’s interpretations of new information.198 This suggests that learning 
about the law before the evidence is presented should give jurors 
appropriate schemas for processing the evidence and enhance their 
ability to identify and remember relevant facts. 
This pre-trial timing of instructions is supported by research into the 
efficacy of jury instructions. One study found that subjects who heard the 
law both before and after the presentation of evidence were better able to 
apply the law to the facts of the case than other subjects.199 Furthermore, 
pre-instruction had no apparent downside: “There were no decrements in 
their abilities to recall the evidence, understand the law, or make verdict 
decisions. It appears, then, that these benefits of pre[-]instruction may be 
realized without cost to jurors’ information processing or decision 
making.”200 Moreover, some research suggests that jurors who hear 
 
 196. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012). Appellate courts have consistently left decisions about the use 
and content of pre-trial instructions to the discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 
1977). Some appellate opinions encourage the use of pre-trial instruction. See Valenzuela, 142 Cal. 
Rptr. at 658 (“[W]e commend the astute judge who tries to give the jury advance notice of the law 
applicable to the case. . . . However, as we see it, the purpose of preinstructing jurors is not to avoid 
the necessity of instructing at the close of argument; rather, it is to give them some advance 
understanding of the applicable principles of law so that they will not receive the evidence and 
arguments in a vacuum.”). Others advise against it. See, e.g., People v. Murillo, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 24 
(Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the preferable method is to give the jury instructions after the close of 
evidence but before closing arguments, while acknowledging that the trial court has discretion on this 
matter). 
 197. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 45, at 98. 
 198. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 199. The author of the study notes, however, that this result cannot be seen as a pure effect of pre-
trial instruction because the group that only received pre-instructions (and no post-instructions) did 
not show this improvement, but the results do indicate that there is benefit in hearing the instructions 
twice. Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision 
Making, 76 J. Applied Psychol. 220, 226 (1991). 
 200. Id. 
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instructions twice—both before and after the presentation of evidence—
have better comprehension than jurors who only hear the instructions 
once.201 Furthermore, instructions could still be repeated at the close of 
evidence and jurors could still be given copies of both the written 
instructions and the pre-trial explanations to take with them into 
deliberations. 
B. Helping Jurors Reduce Schema Perseverance 
Jurors should also be explicitly told to consider the evidence from 
both sides as a means of reducing schema perseverance and bias. 
Although studies have found that demanding that someone be accurate 
and fair does not guarantee that a person will follow that instruction, 
telling people to consider the evidence from both sides might have that 
effect. For example, one study found that instructions to be “as objective 
and unbiased as possible” in reviewing studies on capital punishment did 
not in fact reduce bias.202 However, when subjects were explicitly told to 
consider the new evidence from both points of view, bias was reduced.203 
In other words, if we ask people to monitor their cognitive processes by 
thinking carefully about how they are evaluating evidence and paying 
attention to biases, it seems that we can reduce the impact of bias and 
preexisting schemas on decisionmaking.204 Because most jurors are 
largely unaware of the impact of schemas on decisionmaking, telling 
jurors about schemas and their potential biasing effects before they 
evaluate any evidence might also help to ameliorate the effect of schemas 
on juror decisionmaking.205 
Furthermore, by asking people to be more aware of the ways in 
which schemas—and specifically priming and framing—influence 
decisionmaking, we can, through greater awareness of these typically 
unconscious phenomena, recognize the effect and reduce the impact of 
schemas on decisionmaking.206 For example, although we cannot avoid 
viewing problems through frames, “with effort you can become aware of 
how you are framing a situation and whether there are alternatives.”207 
To do this, people need to become aware of the origins of their frames, 
as well as how others in the same situation might frame the same issue or 
problem. Similarly, if decisionmakers become more aware of their own 
 
 201. Elwork et al., supra note 1, at 177–78. 
 202. Charles G. Lord et al., Consider the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 
47 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1231, 1233, 1237 (1984). 
 203. Id. at 1234. 
 204. Fiske & Taylor, supra note 8, at 172–73. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Robbenholt & Sternlight, supra note 90, at 13 (“It can be helpful to acknowledge the reality 
that preexisting knowledge structures can influence perception and to actively question the basis for a 
particular understanding.”). 
 207. Brest & Krieger, supra note 25, at 36. 
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decisionmaking process, this could have an impact on their susceptibility 
to primes.208 Moreover, priming might also be counteracted through 
instructions that encourage feelings of accountability by jurors.209 
We should also ask jurors to try to create plausible explanations for 
both—or all—sides before coming to a decision. This could reduce 
unwarranted theory perseverance by showing jurors how easily either 
side might be right, or how either theory might be true.210 In a follow-up 
to the firefighter study discussed in Part I,211 Anderson found that if 
people are compelled to explain why their theory might be wrong, the 
perseverance effect was moderated:212 “[I]nducing people to create causal 
explanations of opposite social theories produces more flexible and 
appropriate responses to challenges to those theories.”213 Subjects who 
explained both a positive and a negative relationship between firefighting 
ability and risk preference were significantly less reluctant to abandon 
their initial theory when told that their case history was fictitious.214 Asking 
jurors to describe “potential alternative hypotheses before the 
presentation of evidence may minimize the influence of specific beliefs on 
the part of the individual asked to weigh the evidence.”215 In other words, if 
jurors are asked to articulate theories for both sides before reaching a final 
decision, theory perseverance and thoughtless schema application could be 
minimized. 
Conclusion 
Schemas are powerful—though largely unconscious—frameworks 
that influence the way people see, interpret, and remember information. 
Like any other person interpreting a set of facts, jurors cannot help but 
be influenced by schemas when interpreting facts and applying the law 
during a trial. Furthermore, although the law has made great strides in 
improving juror comprehension of jury instructions, even “plain-language” 
 
 208. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First 
Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 Or. L. Rev. 305, 349 (2010). 
 209. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and 
Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 Pers. & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 563, 568 (1998). 
Some subjects in an anger priming experiment were told that an “expert” would interview them at the 
end of the study to assess their responses and reasoning. Id. at 566. Those subjects reported that they 
engaged in a more deliberative decisionmaking process than that of those who were not accountable 
for their reasoning. Id. at 571. 
 210. Anderson, supra note 71, at 129. Anderson warns, however, that these procedures might not 
be as effective when the theory involved has a strong emotional component, such as a person’s beliefs 
concerning the deterrent effect of capital punishment, because that emotional component might 
prevent people from considering competing theories even when explicitly instructed to do so. Id. at 136. 
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 212. Id. at 134. 
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instructions are vulnerable to the interpretive influence of schemas. Jurors’ 
understanding of the law is typically undeveloped, and therefore their 
schemas for legal concepts are often correspondingly incorrect or 
undeveloped. Moreover, although they may not be correct in their 
assumptions about the law, jurors do not come to trials as blank slates—
they bring with them existing schemas that shape the way they view both 
the law and the facts that are often garnered from the media and popular 
entertainment. 
For this reason, existing jury instructions, which are typically given 
to jurors after the presentation of evidence, do little to counteract or 
correct jurors’ undeveloped or misinformed schemas. Based on findings 
from the social sciences, lawyers and judges should attempt to develop 
jurors’ schemas for the relevant legal concepts to make them better 
organized and more accessible, allowing for more thoughtful judgment 
and more accurate decisionmaking. To accomplish this, jurors should be 
provided with both well-written jury instructions and pre-trial explanations 
of the applicable law, including examples of how the law applies and to 
which they can analogize the facts of the present case. We should also help 
jurors to overcome schema perseverance by asking them to consider the 
evidence from both sides and to attempt to create plausible explanations 
for both sides of a case. These steps will help counteract inappropriate 
preexisting schemas, activate legally appropriate schemas, and result in 
better decisionmaking by jurors. 
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